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NOTES.*
CONFLICT OF LAWS-BY WHAT LAW IS THE LIABILITY OF AN
INSURANCE COMPANY TO PAY, ON THE EXECUTION OF AN INSURED

CRIMINAL, DETERMINED ?-In a recent case the question arose as

to the liability of an insurance company where the insured was put
to death by legal execution for crime. The policy was executed at
the company's office in Wisconsin. It provided that it should not
take effect until the first premium should be paid. It was delivered
to the insured, a resident of Virginia, in the latter state through
the local agent of the company and there the first premium was
paid. Death by legal execution was not excepted by the terms of
the contract.
The representatives of the deceased argued that the contract
should be governed by the law of Wisconsin where it was made, by
which law such an exception would not be implied as in accord with
the public policy of that state. But the court held that Virginia
was the place where the contract was made; that the "proper law"
was, therefore, the law of Virginia; and that the exception under
that law must be read into the contract. In its opinion the court says:
(582)
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"The obligation of a contract undoubtedly depends upon the law
under which it is made."'Now though it is obvious that the court did not here determine
the validity of any part of the contract, still it was necessary to consider it as though containing a positive provision insuring death by
legal execution and ascertain the proper law to govern its validity.
In a state invalidating such a provision the exception would be
implied in its absence, and in regarding the law of the place of
making as the "proper law" the court followed the -rule almost universally adopted in cases involving contracts of insurance.
The principles governing the choice of laws with respect to contracts are frequently stated by courts and text-writers in terms
apparently inconsi'stent and conflicting. As to contracts in general
it has been frequently stated that the validity and effect of a contract
are governed by the law of the place where it is made.2 Again, it
has been stated in numberless cases that the validity interpretation
and obligation of a contract is to be governed by the law of the
place of performance if different from the place of making.3 But,
on examination, these cases do not appear to be in hopeless conflict.
In the great majority of those cited in support of the first rule the
question was as to the formal validity of the contract, i. e., did the
formulistic acts done constitute a contract? On the other hand,
in cases regarding the place of performance as the "proper law,"
the questions raised include questions of breach" and discharge, that
is, performance in law. So it would seem that in many jurisdictions
the rule laid down by Mr. Justice Hunt most exactly expresses the
results obtained in the various decisions. The rule is that "Matters
bearing upon the execution, the interpretation and the validity of a
contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract
is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by
the law prevailing at the place of performance. * * *"4
In some jurisdictions, however, the courts determine what is
the proper law by an examination of the intent of the parties. The
rule is often stated that the parties are presumed to intend the law
of the place of making, unless the contract is to be performed in
a different place, when they are presumed to intend the law of that
place. The doctrine was introduced into the English law by Lord
Mansfield 1 from the civil law, where the idea prevails that a man
1Northwestern

(1912).

Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McCae,

32

Sup. Ct. Rep.

220

. Campbell v. Crampton, 2 Fed. 417 (1880); Roubicep v. Haddad, 67
522 (19o2) ; Hunt v. Jones, 12 R. I. 265 (1879) ; Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 Metc. 381 (1841).
'Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story, 465 (1844); McDaniel v. Chicago & N. W.
R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 412 (1868); Dyke v. Erie R. R., 45 N. Y. II (1871);
Waverly Nat. Bank v. Hall, r5o Pa. 466 (1892); Montana Coal Co. v. Co.,
69 Ohio, 351 (19o4); Springs v. Southbound R. R., 46 S. C. 104 (896);
Benners v. Clemens, 58 Pa. 24 (1868); Graham v. Bank, 84 N. Y. 393 (i881).
"Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 9I U. S.4o6 (1875).
"Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077 (176o).

N. J. L.
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may choose his law, is law in England today, 6 and has spread to
America to considerable extent.7 It is submitted, however, that the
rule is not adopted in its entirety and that these American jurisdictions would still decide questions of formal validity by the law of
the place of making regardless of the intention.8 Under this rule
the place of making and the place of performance of the contract are
only evidence of the intention of the parties, and while the latter is
sufficient alone to decide the question, its presumptive force my be
rebutted by extraneous circumstances.
In dealing with contracts of insurance, however, most cases
have determined the proper law regardless of the intention of the
parties. In the light, then, of the rules laid down in Scudder v.
Bank,9 and which in substance are declared in many other cases, it
would seem that too little attention has been paid to the claims of
the laws of the place of performance as the governing law with
respect to some of the matters arising out of insurance contracts. It
is true the contract in that case was not an insurance contract, but
it is not apparent why the rules laid down there are not applicable
to insurance contracts. However, in cases where an insurance policy is issued in one state to become effective in another, it is held
to be made in the latter and not subject to statutes of the home
state in the matter of forfeiture or non-forfeiture for the non-payment of premiums.' It has been said that these cases only establish
that where the contract is made outside of the state where the
home office of the company is situated, the statutes of that state can
have no extra-territorial effect ;1 but they have been cited, in cases
where a local statute excluding the defense of suicide is in force in
the jurisdictions where the contract was made, for the general prop'In re Missouri S. S. Co., 42 Ch. D. 321 (i889); Lloyd v. Guilbert
L. R., i Q. B. 122 (1865); Chartered Bank of India v. Nay. Co., 9 Q. B. D.
xi8 (1882).

'Liverpool S. S. Co. v. Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397 (i889); Coghlan v.
R. R. Co., x42 U. S. ior (i8gi); Hall v. Codell, I42 U. S. II6 (1891);
Pritchard v. Norton, io6 U. S. 124 (1882); Bell v. Packard, 69 Me. lo5
(1879); New England Mtge. Co. v. McLaughlin, 87 Ga. i (i8gi); Dickenson v. Edwards, 97 N. Y. 573 (1879) ; Thornton v. Dean, 19 S. C. 583 (1883) ;
Grand v. Livingston,' 38 N. Y. S.490 (1896); Cattle Co. v. McNamara, 145
Fed. 17 (i9o6); Davis v. Aetna, 67 N. H. 218 (1892).
'Amer. Mtge. Co. v. Sewell, 92 Ala. 163 (i89o).
'IVide supra (4).
"Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Cohen, 179 U. S.262 (igoo) ; Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Clemens, 140 U. S. 226 (iS89); Griesemer v. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., io Wash. 202 (1894); Fidelity Mut. Life Assn. v. Harris, 94 Tex.
25 (igoo); Equitable Life v. Weinning, 58 Fed. 541 (1893); Antes v. State
Ins. Co., 61 Neb. 55 (igoo); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hathaway, lo6 Fed.
815 (19O); contra: on the ground that such a statute constitutes a limitation on the corporate power to contract applicable wherever the contract may
be made or is by its terms performable; Fidelity Mut. Life Assn. v. McDaniel, 25 Ind. App. 6o8 (igoo); Fidelity Mut. Life Assn. v. Ficklin, 74

Md. I72

(1891).

'Mutual

Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U S. 551

(1903).
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osition that the "proper law" to determine the validity of stipulations in an insurance contract, is the law of the place where the contract was made.1 2 These decisions have all turned on the point
that the contract was consummated where the statute was in force,
and that the law of the place of making was the "proper law" to
apply. Mr. Minor gives as a reason for this, the fact that performance of such a contract,13 that is, the payment of money due thereon,
"will never be illegal."'
This explanation, however, does not seem
sound. The conditions .under which the money is to be paid determine the legality of the payment. The question is one having to do
with performance of the contract and the very one arising in the
principal case. Is there a promise on the part of the company to
perform under the circumstances, or is an exception to its general
promise to pay to be implied where the death is by legal execution
in which case the company is discharged of all obligation and there
is performance in law? -It is submitted that under the rules as
applied to contracts in general the question should be decided by
the law of the place of performance. In the principal case the
place of making and the place of performance being Virginia, the
result would be the same under either law, but the language used
is misleading.
Having decided the "proper law" to be the law of the place
of making, the place of making under the facts was undoubtedly
Virginia. Wherever there is an express stipulation in the contract
that it shall not take effect until payment of the first premium and
the premium does not accompany the application, but the company
sends the policy to its own agent, who delivers the same to the insured upon receipt of the first premium, from the latter, the contract
will be deemed to have been made in the state where the policy was
so delivered and the premium paid.' 4
E. H. B., Jr.
CONTRACTS-PROCUREMENT

OF BREACH.-The

much

mooted

question of the actionability of a procurement of a breach of contract arose in an interesting way in a recent case in North Dakota.,
The plaintiff had contracted with A to find purchasers for A's land
at a commission per acre of land sold. He had also contracted with
B to pay B for procuring such purchasers for him. He alleged that
'Knights

Templar & Mutual Life Indemnity Co. v. Berry, 5o Fed.

affirming 46 Fed. 439 (i8gi); National Union v. Marlow,
74 Fed. 775 (1896).
" Minor; Conflict of Laws, Sec. 37o, n. I.

51I

(1892);

'Equitable

Life Assur. Soc. v. Clemens (vide supra); Mutual Life

Ins. Co. v. Cohen (vide supra) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill (vide supra) ;

Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, i9U. S. App. 266 (1893); Milliard
v. Brayton, 377 Mass. 533 (i9oo); Cravers v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., i78 U. S.
389 (899).
'Sleeper v. Baker, 134 N. W. Rep. 716 (N. D. 1911).
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A and B conspired by fraudulent devices, and with intent to defraud
him, to deal directly with each other, ignoring his agency and cheating him out of moneys due on his contract with A. There was
also an allegation that the purchasers had been procured by the
plaintiff in performance of his contract. The court held that the
allegations of the count against B did not state a cause of action.
"The rule, as we see it, is substantially this; 'that an action cannot
in general be maintained for inducing a third person to break his
contract with the plaintiff, the consequence, after all, being only a
broken contract for which the party to the contract may have his
remedy by suing on it.' ""

The court correctly points out that the allegation of "conspiracy"

has no bearing on the question of civil liability,3 and that the case
in its last analysis is one of the procurement of a breach of contract.
Before discussing the precise point involved in the principal
case a mention of certain well-established rules of law in relation to
rights of free business activity will be useful. No one questions
that the boycott by violence or intimidation is a tort. A man has
a right to have labor or custom flow freely to him and no violent
interference with this right is legally justifiable. 4 The question presented by cases of boycott by economic pressure is a more difficult
one for the law, for in such case the infringement of the plaintiff's
right to deal is caused by the exercise of the same right by the
defendant. In the typical case where A refuses to deal with B, if
B deals with C, before the decision of Walker v. Cronin,5 the American cases took the position that C's right to deal or refuse to deal,
being an absolute right, A was not liable for any injury resulting
from the exercise of that right ;' and even later in England this doctrine of absolute rights prevailed.7 The statement of law found in
'This quotation of the court is from Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. at
z26 (i8gi), where the court in that case quotes from Cooley on Torts, 2nd
Ed., 581.
"In a very early English case, Savile v. Roberts, i Ld. Raym. 374, we
find these words: "Though in the old books such actions are called conspiracies, yet they are nothing in fact but actions on the case." The Supreme
Court of Kentucky, citing these words of Lord Holt, said: "It is clear,
therefore, as well upon the authority of other cases, as that of Savile v.
Roberts, that an act which if done by one alone, constitutes no ground of
an action on the case, cannot be made the ground of such an action by
alleging it to have been done by and through a conspiracy of several."
Kimball v. Haman, 34 Ky. at 411 (187). Cases which may possibly be
considered contra are: Blindell v. Hagan, 54 Fed. 40 (1893); affirmed in
Hagan v. Bindell, 56 Fed. 696, C. C. A. (1893); Elder v. Whitesides, 72
Fed. 724 (1895); City v. Produce Exchange, 48 L. R. A. go (igoo).
. 'Yanett v. Taylor, Cro. James Rep. 567 (162o); Tarleton v. McYawley,
i Peake,-2o5 (1793).
bio7 Mass. 555 (187).

Orr v. Insurance Co., 12 La. Ann. 255 (1857); Bowen v. Matheson, 96
Mass. 499 (1867).
'Allen v. Flood, A. C. i (1898); Huttely v. Simmons (1895), 67 L. J.
Q. B. 213; but see Quinn v. Leatham (igoi), A. C. 495.

NOTES
Walker v. Cronin, supra, is an expression of the theory which is
the foundation of the doctrine of relative rights. "Any act, the
natural result of which is an injury to a particular person, knowingly done by one person, and resulting in injury to the other, renders the actor liable to the injured person, unless the actor has just
cause and excuse." If, in the statement of the rule the want of
just cause and excuse is called "malice," or "purely malicious
motive," the rule, though perhaps clouded, is not altered. The application of this rule has resulted in a general trend of authority that
a boycott by economic pressure is a tort.8 Cases taking the opposite
view 9 are explained, it is submitted, not by a difference in views of
the law, but because of the comparative ease in finding just cause
and excuse when "capital" boycotts "labor," owing to the different
economic aspect of the case.
It must be noted that this doctrine has led the courts to hold
many acts to be torts, which could not be enjoined, however inadequate the legal remedy, because such injunction would of necessity
be an order for personal service or a prohibition of the free expression of ideas. The question of equitable remedy, therefore, has no
proper bearing on the question of the actionability of acts of the
character under discussion.
If, then, the fact that the defendant's acts could not be stopped
in equity does not prevent their amounting to a tort at law, it would
seem that a boycott by persuasion might, under Walker v. Cronin,
supra, be held a tort if no justification could be found for it. However, to support an action under the facts of the principal case, it
is not necessary to go to the length.of so holding, for in the principal
case there is a pre-existing contract the breach of which is procured, a fact lacking in the ordinary case of boycott.
On the question presented in the principal case the authority
is in conflict. The rule sustaining the action undoubtedly had its
origin in the English Statute of Labourers 10 and the early law with
regard to the seduction of servants, and the conflict seems, in the
main, to be, whether it should be extended so as to apply to any
case which presents the facts necessary to found an action on the
case under the rule of Walker v. Cronin, supra. It has, beyond a
doubt, been thus extended in England in the now famous cases of
Lumley v. Gye, 11 and Bowen v. Hall,'12 although Lord Coleridge
dissented in both of those decisions on the ground that such actions
ought not to be allowed where the relation of master and servant
does not exist. Walker v. Cronin was the first case to follow Lumley v. Gye in America. This case, and Haskins v. Royster,13 which
'Moores v. Bricklayers' Union,
'Raycroft v. Taynor, 68 Vt.
23
U2

Edw. III.
Ell. & BI. 228 (853).

"L. R. 6 Q. B. Div. 333 (1881).
7'ToN. C. 6oi

(874).

23

219

Ohio W. L. B. 48 (1899).
(I896).
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followed it, adopted the extended doctrine in their language, 14 but
were, in their facts, cases of contracts of employment. Three years
later the North Carolina court held that the reasons for the decision
of Haskins v. Royster "cover every case where one person persuades
another to break any contract with a third person."' 15 Many cases 1
in America can be found which, it is submitted, go to this length,
unless they are susceptible of the distinction sought to be applied
to them in the principal case. That distinction seems to be this:
That to the general rule that an action lies for the procurement of
a breach on contract there are two exceptions: first, where the contract is one of employment, vide supra; and second, "where a person has been procured against his will or contrary to his purpose,
by coercion or deception of another to break his contract." This
second exception is fully discussed in Chambers v. Baldwin 17 and
Boyson v. Thorn,' and adopted by the courts deciding those cases.
If it is sound, it can, perhaps, be made to explain all the cases which
have extended the original rule, and will, of course, exclude the
principal case.
It is submitted that the exception is not sound. Force and
fraud are not the only unjustifiable means of procuring a breach of
contract. Mere persuasion may come equally within the rule of
Walker v. Cronin. Moreover, it does not seem necessary that the
breach be against the will of the party breaking the contract in order
to render it the proximate result of the defendant's acts. 9 Such
a requisite could properly be made if the question were one of
criminal liability.
It is submitted that there was no justification for the defendant's acts in the principal case. It is certainly not a case of altruistic
persuasion, nor even one of ordinary competition, as the defendant
was, by his contract with the plaintiff, at least morally bound not to
take the action he took. It is true that a strong group of authorities
can be arrayed in support of the principal case; but it is believed
that the contrary view is reached by courts which endeavor to keep
the law abreast of modern economic advancement.
F.L.B.
"Rodman, J., in Haskins v. Royster, 7o N. C. 6ol (1874), quoting from
Walker v. Cronin, supra: "We are satisfied that it is founded upon the
legal right derived from the contract and not merely upon the relation
of master and servant, and that it applies to all contracts of employment
if not to contracts of every description."
" Jones v. Stanley, 76 N. C. 355 (1877).
."Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y., 82 (1876); Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385;
Green v. Button, 2 Cromp. M. & R. 707.
" Chaijibers v. Baldwin, i Ky. at 127 (89). "98 Cal. 578 (1893). "Bowen v. Hall, L R. 6 Q. B. Div. 333 (188).

NOTES
MISTAKE-RESCISSION-MEANING

OF THE WORD "MUTUAL.-

In Frazier et al., v. State Bank of Decatur,' the defendants were
members of the board of directors of a corporation. The note of the
corporation payable to the order of the plaintiff fell due. The plaintiff agreed to a renewal of the note, provided the directors would
execute in their individual capacities, and accordingly sent a note
reading: "We, or either of us, promise to pay," etc., for the defendants to execute. The directors erased the words "or either of us,"
inserted the words "as directors," executed the note and returned
it to the plaintiff. On discovering the mistake, an action was brought
on the original note. Recovery was allowed.
A mistake to justify rescission and the cancellation of instruments must be one occurring in the bargain itself,2 or in transactions
leading up to the bargain,. the importance of which is 3of such magnitude that they are in reality part of the bargain itself. A mistake
as to a purely collateral matter will not justify rescission.4 The
plaintiff in these cases seeks to be restored to stata quo, to have the
contract nullified-in other words, he acts in complete disaffirmance
of his bargain." The fact that the subject-matter of the contract is
a negotiable instrument does not prevent the admission of the evidence to show that there was no contract. 6
A mistake which justifies reformation is one which occurs, not
in the bargain itself, but subsequent to the bargain; it is a mistake
in reducing to writing the contract of the parties.7 There must be
a valid pre-existing contract and a mistake in giving expression to
the meaning of the parties to justify reformation. 8 A mistake which
justifies rescission will not justify the court in awarding reformation,
nor will a mistake justifying reformation justify the court in awarding rescission.0 The above case is in harmony with established
principles.
1141 S. W. (Ark.) 941, (i9i).
2
Rupley v. Dagget, 74 Ill. 353 (1874) ; Goddard v. Insurance Co., io8
Mass. 56 (i87i) ; Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. and C. 9o6 (1864).
'Broughton v. Hutt, 3 DeG. and J. 5oi (1858); Griffith v. Sebastian
County, 49 Ark. 24 (i886). The court in the leading case views the transaction
as the sale of a chattel. It is submitted that all questions of the materiality
of mistake in cases of contract are really founded on the well-known rules
in Jones v. Just, g B. and S. 141 (1868), though these rules are but seldom

cited in cases of mistake.
'Dambwann v. Schulting, 75 N. Y. 55 (1878).
'Crowe v. Lewin, 95 N. Y. 423 (1884) ; Webster v. Stark, io Lea (Tenn.)
406 (1882).

'Daniel, Negotiable Instruments, Fourth Ed., Vol. I, Sec. 81b.
'Canedy v. Marcy, i3 Gray, 373 (1859); Pitcher v. Hennessey, 48 N. Y.

415 (x872).

'As to the necessity of the mistake being mutual in cases of reformation, see ii Columbia L R. 303.
'A few well recognized exceptions to this rule may be found. Willes

v. Yates, 44 N. Y. 525 (i871) ; Griswold v. Hazard, 14i U. S. 26o (i8gi).
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The law has been somewhat unsettled in cases of rescission and
reformation until recently, due not so much to the inherent difficulty
of the subject as to the confusing terminology of the cases. The
word "mutual" has been used to mean "common," and "reciprocal" ;10
and our leading case is not exempt from this inaccuracy. A mistake
which is either mutual ("mutual" used in its strict sense meaning
"common") or reciprocal will justify rescission. The cases where
the mistake is mutual are)easyof identification, 1 ' but the cases where
the mistake is reciprocal are not so easy to recognize and calling these
2
mistakes "mutual" has caused much uncertainty.
"A unilateral mistake, coupled with ignorance thereof by the
other party, does not constitute a mutual mistake,113 and will not
Careful diction in the decisions .will do much
justify rescission."
toward clarifying an avoidable confusion in legal phraseology.

C.A.S.

10 See the following articles: "Law as to Mistake of Fact in Its Effect
Upon Contracts," Truman Post Young, 38 Amer. Law Rev. 384 (I9o4);
"Mistake in Contract," Roland R. Foulke, iiColumbia Law Rev. 197, 299
(911).
" Conturier v. Hastie, 5 H. L. C. 673 (I856).
'Notes to Mr. Foulke's article, p. 209.
""Mistake of Fact as a Ground for Affirmative Equitable Relief," Edwin
H. Abbot, Jr., 23 Harvard Law Rev. 608 (igio), the most satisfactory treatment of this subject.
9.
"'Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 226 Ill.

